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This paper investigates the performance impact of undertaking activities through scale 
alliances rather than undertaking the same activities autonomously. Scale alliances are horizontal 
alliances in which all partners contribute similar resources and assets. Previous research has 
shown that incumbent firms form scale alliances rather than invest autonomously when they 
undertake activities with higher minimum efficient scales (MES) and if their ability to reach the 
activities’ MES on their own is more limited (Garrette, Castañer, Dussauge, 2006). Scale 
alliances are thus a means for competitors to jointly increase the scale of their activities and to 
compensate for their limited resource endowment by pooling resources and joining forces with 
other firms facing the same predicament. The objective of this paper is to investigate the extent to 
which scale alliances fulfill these objectives. More specifically, we examine whether activities 
carried out in the context of scale alliances outperform or under perform similar activities carried 
out on a single firm basis. We do so taking into account the endogeneity of governance mode 
choice (scale alliance vs. autonomous production). Indeed, factors driving a firm to select a scale 
alliance over autonomous production to undertake a given activity might in themselves influence 
the performance of this activity. Based on the alliance outcome literature, on the resource-based 
view of the firm and on transaction cost economics, we propose that, when compared to 
autonomous production, scale alliances have a bi-directional effect on the performance of the 
activities they cover: while they improve the firms’ ability to reach the MES, they also create 
specific costs that increase the MES. In doing so, we try to disentangle the performance impact of 
collaboration by examining both the benefits it produces and the costs it generates. 
The empirical setting for our study is the global aircraft industry. We test our predictions 
on a sample of 225 aircraft projects undertaken either through scale alliances or on a single-firm 
basis by 82 aircraft manufacturers in the Western hemisphere from 1948 until 2000.  
  2We find that, taking into account the endogeneity of the choice between collaborative and 
autonomous production, firms forming scale alliances achieve greater commercial success than if 
they had chosen to launch the same projects autonomously. However, collaborative projects incur 
higher development costs (therefore higher up-front investments) than similar projects 
undertaken by firms with equivalent features on their own. 
SCALE AND LINK ALLIANCES 
The literature on horizontal inter-firm alliances has suggested that pursuing scale benefits 
and leveraging complementarities are two main motivations for firms to collaborate (Kogut, 
1988). This has led to categorize horizontal alliances as either scale alliances or link alliances 
(Hennart, 1988). This typology classifies alliances according to the partners’ contributions to the 
joint activity. In scale alliances, the partner firms contribute similar resources to the same stage or 
stages in the value chain. Scale alliances are arrangements between industry incumbents which 
include joint R&D efforts, the joint production of components, sub-assemblies or even an entire 
product. Link alliances, in contrast, aim at combining different skills and resources contributed 
by each partner. Link alliances include partnerships in which one partner provides market access 
to technologies or products that the other firm has developed. Surveys of horizontal alliance 
activity support Hennart’s scale/link categorization and show that complementary alliances are 
more prevalent in some industries and scale alliances in others (Hergert and Morris, 1987; 
Dussauge and Garrette, 1995; Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Furthermore, research on the performance 
impact of alliances suggests that scale and link alliances are formed by firms pertaining to 
different strategic groups and lead to contrasted outcomes (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; 
Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000; 2004; Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2002). Partners in scale 
alliances are more similar in size and geographic origin than partners in link alliances; link 
  3alliances are less stable than scale alliances and lead to more asymmetric outcomes for the 
involved partners (Dussauge et al., 2000, 2004). While this categorization of alliances is widely 
accepted, research on alliance formation, management and outcomes has primarily focused, 
explicitly or implicitly, on link alliances. As a consequence, conclusions derived from the 
analysis of link alliances are often assumed to be applicable to all forms of horizontal alliances.  
In this paper, we focus specifically on scale alliances and examine the performance 
impact of turning to such an arrangement to carry out an activity that the considered firm could 
have chosen instead to undertake on its own. Prior research has shown that firms are more likely 
to undertake an activity through a scale alliance rather than autonomously when the activity has a 
higher minimum efficient scale and targets a smaller market, when the size of the firm is smaller 
and its experience in the considered activity is more limited (Garrette, Castañer, Dussauge, 2006). 
These results support the idea according to which scale alliances are primarily formed to 
undertake projects that require higher investments and by competitors suffering from a more 
limited resource endowment. This raises the issue of the efficiency of scale alliances as a 
mechanism for firms to pool the resources they need to undertake activities requiring high levels 
of investment.  
ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOMES 
Several perspectives have examined alliance performance and outcomes (Uzzi, 1996; 
Gulati, 1998). A first early stream of research has focused on the success of the alliance itself and 
has often used alliance stability and duration as an indicator of success. Later research has 
examined the impact of alliance outcomes on the involved partner firms and has focused 
primarily on inter-partner learning. More recently, a third approach has investigated the 
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or acquisitions) while taking into account the endogeneity of the governance mode choice. 
Most early studies on the outcomes of joint ventures tried to identify factors, such as 
partner asymmetries, joint venturing experience, joint venture scope, industry structure, R&D 
intensity, inter-partner rivalry, and governance structure, that influence alliance duration and 
stability (Janger, 1980; Killing, 1982, 1983; Beamish, 1984, 1985; Beamish and Banks, 1987; 
Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1988, 1989; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Blodgett, 1992; Park and Russo, 
1996; Park and Ungson, 1997). These studies however examine differing levels of performance 
among alliances but do not investigate the performance impact of alliances by comparing them to 
the option of not collaborating.  
A second stream of research has shifted the focus from the fate of the alliance itself to the 
consequences of allying for the partner firms. Studies based on stock market reactions to alliance 
announcements have shown that investors tend to react positively to such announcements 
(McConnell and Nantell, 1985; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991). These studies implicitly compare 
forming alliances with not collaborating but do not compare the alliance option to other means of 
carrying out the same activity. Other studies that examine the impact of alliances on the fate of 
partner firms have focused on the learning and skill acquisition that tend to occur between the 
allied firms, especially in alliances among competitors (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Hamel, 
1991; Kanter, 1994; Doz, 1996; Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). 
These studies that link alliance outcome to inter-partner learning in fact assume that alliance 
partners have an incentive to learn from each other, which in turn suggests that they have 
different capabilities. In addition, for alliances to lead to inter-partner learning, they must create a 
context in which each partner has access to attractive capabilities possessed by the other. This in 
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have formed a link alliance. It thus appears that research on alliance outcomes and performance 
has primarily focused either on the fate of the alliance itself, without discriminating between 
types of alliances, or on the impact of collaboration on the involved firms in terms of learning 
and capability acquisition, focusing implicitly on link alliances. In contrast, very little research 
has explored the drivers of performance in scale alliances. A few larger sample studies have also 
explored the impact of alliance activity on the ongoing financial performance and survival of the 
parent businesses (Berg, Duncan, and Friedman, 1982; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; 
Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Singh and Mitchell, 1996). These studies report that parents often 
benefit from alliances, but that alliance activity also carries risks and costs. Collaboration benefits 
include accessing complementary resources, acquiring tacit knowledge, sharing costs and 
investments, mitigating risks, entering new markets or new business domains, complementing 
product lines, and increasing market power (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Baum et al., 2000; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998; Oliver, 1990). Collaboration costs comprise 
monitoring costs, coordination costs, dependence on a partner, loss of proprietary knowledge, as 
well as the risk of creating or strengthening a competitor (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; 
Dussauge, Garrette, Mitchell, 2000; White and Lui, 2005). However, as mentioned above, this 
research on alliance performance has primarily focused on a resource-complementarity 
arguments, downplaying the performance issues raised by scale related benefits and costs. 
Finally, several scholars have investigated the performance impact of collaboration 
compared to other governance modes (e.g. internal growth or acquisitions). Drawing primarily 
upon the Transaction Cost Theory which argues that firms select governance modes based on the 
characteristics of the transactions they engage in, this stream of research suggests that firms tend 
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activity to be implemented. In this perspective, what influences performance is not the 
governance choice in itself, but the fit between the governance mode and the attributes of both 
the firm and the project it undertakes (Williamson, 1975; Masten, 1993; Brouthers, Brouthers and 
Werner, 2003; Sampson, 2004; Geyskens, Steenkamp, Kumar, 2006). These results suggest that, 
when examining performance differences across governance modes, those factors that lead firms 
to select one governance mode over another need to be controlled for.  
Our own research builds on this third approach and assesses the performance impact of 
collaboration by comparing activities undertaken through alliances with similar activities 
undertaken by similar firms on their own, taking into account the endogeneity of governance 
mode choice. In addition, we focus on scale alliances and seek to disentangle the costs and 
benefits they entail. 
TOWARD A RESOURCE-BASED VIEW OF SCALE ALLIANCES 
The classical resource-based approach (Penrose, 1959) suggests that a firm’s resource 
endowment determines its growth. Indeed, according to Penrose (1959), most resources are 
fungible, that is, they can be redeployed to additional uses, other than the current one. The same 
argument has been applied to more intangible competences (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).  
Because its main focus is on the growth of the firm, the resource-based view has primarily 
considered the use that firms can make of their excess resources. Pursuing this line of reasoning, 
subsequent work has examined how firms can leverage these excess resources by combining 
them with complementary resources possessed by other firms, when these complementary 
resources are not easily tradable (Teece, 1986). This view thus explains the formation of link 
alliances. In this perspective, link alliances are formed to pursue expansion opportunities at the 
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alliances have an incentive to reduce their dependence on their partner and to acquire or replicate, 
whenever possible, the resources they lack to carry out the new business on their own. Hence the 
above mentioned focus on inter-partner learning and capability acquisition as a determinant of 
alliance outcome and even as a criterion of success for the partner firms. 
  While the resource-based view has theorized the use of excess resources as a 
driver of firm growth, it has paid less attention to the implications of a firm’s lack of resources. 
Indeed, existing firms in any business are assumed to possess a resource endowment which 
allows them to operate at an adequate level of performance. However, industry evolution and 
competitive dynamics may raise the minimum level of resources required to continue competing 
in the industry. The additional resources required may be different in nature, which then takes us 
back to the above examined case, or similar to those already possessed, but in greater quantities. 
When confronted with the latter challenge, firms must increase their stock of existing resources 
or disappear. They can acquire such additional resources on the market for resources (through 
raising capital, hiring and investing in additional assets) or on the market for corporate control 
(through mergers and acquisitions). An alternative option is to pool their existing resources with 
those of other industry incumbents facing the same challenge and form a scale alliance. Scale 
alliances are thus a means for industry incumbents confronted with increasing levels of minimum 
efficient scale, or with differing levels of MES across activities or products, to continue operating 
in their industry without partaking in industry concentration (Hennart, 1988; Garrette et al., 
2006). This raises the issue of the performance of scale alliances when compared to other 
arrangements firms can turn to when faced with levels of MES they are unable to achieve on their 
own. 
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 We propose that, when compared to autonomous production, scale alliances have a bi-
directional effect on the performance of the activities they cover: they improve the firms’ ability 
to reach the MES but they also create specific costs that increase this MES.  
Prior research has shown that scale alliances are selected over autonomous production by 
smaller firms with a limited resource endowment when undertaking projects with a high MES 
and a narrow market potential (Garrette et al., 2006). It thus appears that scale alliances are 
formed to allow firms to carry out projects that they would be unable to undertake profitably on 
their own. Scale alliances aim at improving a firm’s ability to reach a project’s MES by pooling 
its current resources and assets with those of other industry incumbents facing similar constraints. 
For example, firms engaged in scale alliances can pool their R&D assets to jointly develop a new 
product, allocate production to their various plants and use all available sales networks to broaden 
the product’s commercial reach. In aerospace, all Airbus partners lacked sufficient resources to 
undertake the production of a modern airliner on their own; by pooling their resources, they 
proved capable of competing successfully with Boeing. In addition, producing a single aircraft 
reduced competition in the industry, increasing the likelihood that all partner firms could reach 
the MES and achieve acceptable levels of profitability. Finally, such collaboration mitigates the 
risk supported by each partner firm; this is critical when major investments entail a risk that is too 
heavy to carry for any one of the partner firms. 
  At the same time, scale alliances entail specific costs and risks. Coordinating 
activities and allocating tasks across several partner firms create significant negotiation and 
management costs while collaborating with competitors can lead to opportunism and loss of 
proprietary knowledge. These monitoring and coordination costs (White and Lui, 2005) will 
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a project undertaken on a single firm basis. In the case of Airbus, for instance, implementing the 
project as an alliance between four firms originating in four different countries has led to lengthy 
negotiations on the distribution of tasks among partners and to a duplication of final assembly 
lines in two different locations (Toulouse in France and Hamburg in Germany). As a result, 
undertaking a project through a scale alliance creates coordination costs that are likely to increase 
upfront investments as well as ongoing costs and, thus, drive up the MES of the project, when 
compared to carrying out the same project autonomously.  
Overall, when compared to autonomous production, scale alliances have three main 
impacts on the economy of a project being undertaken by a given firm. First, scale alliances allow 
for a sharing of upfront investments among the partners but also entail a sharing of profits along 
the same lines: this lowers the hurdle for each partner but has no effect on the profitability each 
of them derives from the project. Second, as mentioned above, scale alliances create specific 
costs that increase the MES of the project. Third, they make it easier for the partner firms to reach 
the project’s MES by expanding the market through the pooling of the various partners’ customer 
bases and the leveraging of all partners’ distribution networks. In addition, the formation of a 
scale alliance prevents the allied firms from each launching competing projects on their own. In 
oligopoly situations, a scale alliance thus limits the number of competing products and increases 
the likelihood the joint product will reach its MES. The main benefit of scale alliances is thus to 
increase the potential sales volume of collaborative projects when compared to single-firms 
projects. In a nutshell, by engaging in a scale alliance, each partner has a smaller share of a 
project that is likely to achieve larger sales and thus reach its MES more easily, despite greater 
overall costs.  
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on the economy of a project being undertaken by a given firm. On the one hand, they create 
specific costs that increase the MES of the project. On the other hand they enhance sales and thus 
make it easier for the firm to reach the project’s MES. Hence the two following hypotheses: 
H1: Activities undertaken in the context of scale alliances achieve greater sales volumes 
than similar activities undertaken by each partner on a single-firm basis. 
H2: Activities undertaken in the context of scale alliances entail higher costs than similar 
activities undertaken by each partner on a single-firm basis. 
METHODS 
Empirical Setting 
The empirical setting for our study is the aircraft industry in the Western hemisphere. 
Unlike in most other industries, aircraft manufacturers have been collaborating with each other 
for many years to develop, manufacture and commercialize new products. In addition, most 
horizontal alliances in this industry, i.e. alliances between incumbent airframe manufacturers, 
appear to be motivated primarily by the pursuit of scale benefits.  
In the aircraft industry, upfront investments, notably airframe development costs, are 
extremely high and have been increasing significantly over time. As a consequence, the aircraft 
industry has undergone major consolidation over the years. However, national security concerns 
– which primarily prevail in the case of military aircraft but also affect commercial aircraft 
because both are produced by the same firms and share technology extensively – have limited the 
potential for international consolidation as well as for licensing. This has led airframe 
manufacturers to turn extensively to collaboration to jointly produce aircraft. Most of these 
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by sharing the prime-contractorship. Joint prime-contractorship entails jointly defining product 
features, sharing investments, risks and benefits. In such arrangements, the partner firms usually 
split the development work among themselves and then each partner assumes responsibility for 
manufacturing (sometimes turning to subcontracting) those elements and modules it has 
developed. Final assembly is either entrusted to one partner through the work split agreement or, 
more commonly, duplicated, i.e. carried out simultaneously by several partners. Marketing and 
sales are either split among the partner firms on a geographic basis or entrusted to an ad hoc joint 
sales organization (Dussauge and Garrette, 1995). Overall, such joint prime-contractorship 
arrangements have accounted for close to 20 % of all new aircraft developed since WWII (Jane’s 
All the World’s Aircraft, 1945 – 2003). These arrangements are a means for aircraft 
manufacturers to deal with the minimum efficient scale issue by sharing the burden of upfront 
investments, reducing the number of products competing in the market and lengthening 
production runs through the pooling of demand originating in different countries. Based on these 
features, and consistent with the literature on horizontal alliances (Hennart, 1988; Dussauge, 
Garrette and Mitchell, 2000, 2004; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Ghemawat, Porter and Rawlinson, 
1986; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991), most joint prime-contractorship agreements in the aircraft 
industry can be interpreted as scale alliances. Indeed, they associate industry incumbents, even 
competitors, that undertake a project jointly by contributing similar assets and resources at the 
same stages in the value chain.  
We acknowledge that joint prime-contractorship is only one of the multiple forms that 
inter-firm collaboration can take on in the aircraft industry. Airframe manufacturers routinely 
collaborate with complementors such as engine makers or electronic equipment providers. They 
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agreements. These arrangements, however, cannot be considered as scale alliances because the 
involved partners are not incumbents in the same industry or at least do not operate at the same 
stage in the value chain.  
The saliency of minimum efficient scale issues in aircraft manufacturing, which results in 
the widespread formation of scale alliances, makes this industry a particularly suitable setting in 
which to test our arguments. In addition, despite the prevalence of scale alliances in this industry, 
differences in minimum efficient scale across projects as well as differences across firms have led 
to different firms making different governance choices (autonomous production or production 
through a scale alliance) for similar projects and to the same firm making different governance 
choices for different projects. This makes it possible to test the hypothesized influence of 
undertaking a project through a scale alliance rather than autonomously on the resulting product’s 
performance.   
Population and Sample 
We considered the population of civil and military aircraft projects launched in the 
Western hemisphere from 1944 up to 2000, i.e. projects for which aircraft deliveries began during 
this time span. The population includes four types of aircraft: fighter aircraft, jet transport 
aircraft, propeller aircraft, and helicopters. We gathered data from two sources: Jane’s All the 
World Aircraft annual reports and DMS Forecast databases which list all aircraft models in 
production during a given year. Jane’s All the World Aircraft, published since 1909, is the major 
reference source on aircraft programs, covering the entire worldwide production. The Jane 
reports classify aircraft by country of origin and, within each country, by prime-contractor (e.g. 
the Dassault Rafale fighter is listed in the “France” section under the “Dassault” heading). 
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the V22 tilt-rotor aircraft is in the US section and listed twice under both the Bell Textron and 
Boeing headings). Programs undertaken by multiple prime-contractors from different countries 
are listed in an “International Programmes” section under a heading identifying all prime-
contractors. We classified all aircraft projects included in our sample as either alliances or 
autonomous projects based on whether they were listed under one or more prime-contractors in 
Jane reports. 
We did not include production under license in our analysis. Indeed, in licensed 
production, the licensee takes on none of the responsibilities of a prime contractor: in particular, 
licensees do not participate in the definition of essential product features or in technology 
development and limit their contribution to manufacturing a pre-existing product and 
commercializing it in a specific market area. Licensed production is therefore neither autonomous 
production (single prime-contractorship) nor an alliance (shared prime-contractorship). Licensed 
production can be viewed instead as a market transaction on technology and product design. In 
addition, were we to consider licensing agreements as alliances, they would fall into the link 
alliance category because the firms involved make asymmetric and complementary contributions 
to the venture: design and technology by the licensor and manufacturing and sales in a given area 
by the licensee.  
The objective of our study is to examine the performance impact of launching a new 
aircraft either on a single firm basis (i.e. by taking on the full prime-contractor responsibility), or 
in collaboration (i.e. by sharing the prime-contractor responsibility with another aircraft industry 
incumbent). The unit of analysis is thus an industry incumbent launching a new aircraft project, 
either on its own or through a scale alliance. We therefore considered each firm-project 
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each alliance resulted in as many observations as there were co-prime contractors involved in the 
project. We were able to gather the necessary information for 225 aircraft project-firm 
observations with deliveries taking place between 1948 and 2000.  
These 225 observations corresponded to only 82 different firms, as several firms had 
launched more than one project in the considered period. The 225 sample cases consisted of 56 
collaborative project-firm observations (involving 30 firms) and 169 single-firm projects 
launched by 71 different firms. We only considered incumbent firms. In others words, all projects 
in our dataset were launched by firms with prior sales experience in the same business domain 
(i.e. fighter aircraft, jet transport aircraft, propeller aircraft or helicopters). 
Statistical Methods  
To test our hypotheses on the performance impact of scale alliances while accounting for 
the endogeneity of governance mode choice (scale alliance vs. autonomous production), we used 
two-stage treatment effect models (Shaver, 1998; Greene, 2003; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). 
In the first stage of the treatment models, we linked the governance mode choice to a set of 
explanatory factors using a probit regression on our sample of 225 projects.  
In the second stage, we used OLS regressions to compare the sales and cost performance 
of projects undertaken either autonomously or through scale alliances, controlling for the 
endogeneity of governance mode choice. 
The multiple observations for some firms (225 projects for 82 firms) are not totally 
independent from each other, raising a concern of possible heteroscedasticity. To address this 
issue we clustered our data by firm (Wooldridge, 2002, § 13.8.2). Such an approach provides a 
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independent within firms (Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002). 
In the first step of our analysis (see model 1), we ran a probit regression to model the 
choice of forming a scale alliance or producing autonomously, based on a set of factors derived 
from prior research (Garrette et al. 2006). This produced a self-selection variable that captures the 
endogeneity of governance mode choice. This variable λ was obtained by using inverse Mill’s 
ratios (Greene, 2003) and was introduced as a control variable in the second stage of our analysis.  
In the second stage of our analysis (see models 2 & 3), we examined the performance of 
projects undertaken either through scale alliances or on a single-firm basis while controlling for 
the endogeneity of governance mode choice. We argued that, compared to autonomous 
production, scale alliances have a bi-directional effect on project performance. While they create 
specific costs that increase the MES of the project, they enhance sales and thus make it easier for 
the firm to reach the project’s MES. Hence, we assessed performance through the two following 
dependent variables: (1) project sales and (2) project development time (in models 2 and 3 
respectively). Both models use governance mode as an independent variable along with several 
control variables. 
Variables 
Governance mode  
We defined a dummy variable indicating whether a given firm undertaking a particular 
aircraft project is doing so as the single prime contractor (Scale alliance = 0) or by sharing the 
prime contractorship with one or several other industry incumbents (Scale alliance = 1).  
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an independent variable in the two second stage models. 
First stage independent variables 
In the first stage of our analysis (model 1), we used ten variables that may influence the 
choice of one governance mode over another: Project Scale, Market Size, Firm Size, Domain-
Specific Know-How, Cooperative Competence, Prototype Year, Product Type, Military, Number 
of Competitors, State-Owned. These variables were estimated at the beginning of product 
development, i.e. one year before the prototype first flight.  
We first assessed Project Scale through a proxy capturing the level of upfront investment 
required to develop and produce the aircraft being launched. This proxy is the product’s 
technological complexity which is associated with the number of components and technologies to 
be combined, the sophistication of these components and technologies, as well as the way of 
combining them (Henderson and Clark, 1990). By technological complexity we thus refer to the 
position of the new product in the existing product range, in terms of performance, attributes and, 
therefore, development cost. We measured Project Scale with the logarithm of the aircraft’s 
maximum speed (in km/h) multiplied by its range (in km) and takeoff weight (in kg), as reported 
by Jane’s and DMS Forecast. We used logarithms in order to account for the fact that the (speed 
* range * weight) product increases exponentially with technical complexity.
2 Such a measure 
has been frequently used in other studies on the aircraft industry (Frenken and Leydesdorff, 
2000).  
                                                 
2 By using the logarithm, we considered the interval between a (speed * range * weight) product of 100 and a (speed 
* range * weight) product of 200 to be equivalent to the one between (speed * range * weight) products of 1,000 and 
2,000. In contrast, using (speed * range * weight) products directly would have led to equate an increase from 100 to 
200, which is significant, with an increase from 1,000 to 1,100, which is not significant.   
  17We assessed the size of the market accessible to a given firm launching a particular 
project by using the GDP of this firm’s home country a year prior to the prototype first flight. 
GDP for the 1948-1999 period was collected from Maddison (2003). Because the distribution is 
highly skewed, we log-transformed this data to generate our Market Size variable. This indicator 
is a proxy for the size of the demand a new aircraft launched by any one prime contractor can 
expect to tap into. We also estimated the GDP growth in the firm’s home country at the time the 
governance mode was chosen by averaging the GDP growth over five years before the prototype 
first flight. Annual GDP growth were also obtained from Maddison (2003). 
We assessed Firm Size by using a revenue proxy which we constructed by considering all 
the firm’s different aircraft in production in the four product types a year prior to the focal 
prototype first flight. We estimated the annual volume of production for a given model by 
dividing the total volume produced in its entire life cycle (i.e. up to 2000) by the number of years 
during which the model was manufactured, assuming a yearly constant production volume. These 
data come from both Jane’s annual reports and DMS Forecast database. Then, we determined the 
annual revenues each model generated by multiplying its annual volume by the mean of its DMS 
Forecast estimated price range in 1999 dollars. We replaced missing prices by price estimates 
that we obtained by regressing prices on products’ technical characteristics: maximum speed, 
range and takeoff weight.
3 Summing the annual revenues for all the aircraft products 
manufactured that year, we obtained an estimate of each year’s firm aircraft revenues. We were 
forced to turn to such an estimate because our data spans a fifty year period and covers 18 
countries
4, making it very difficult to collect comprehensive data on aircraft sales for each 
                                                 
3 We conducted a price regression for each of the four different product types (propellers, jets, helicopters, and 
fighters) and obtained significant models with a R
2 ranging from .76 to .94. 
4 Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China (cooperation only), France , Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States 
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total revenues of large diversified groups is almost impossible for periods of time or in countries 
where reporting business line figures was not mandatory. Again, we also we log-transformed this 
data to generate our Firm Size variable. 
We captured the firm’s Domain-Specific Know-How with a variable based on the 
number of projects that the firm has previously developed as a prime contractor in the same 
product type as the considered project (fighter aircraft, jet transport aircraft, propeller aircraft, or 
helicopters). We gathered this data from Jane’s annual reports. In addition, to denote the fact that 
domain know-how is unlikely to increase linearly with the cumulated number of past projects, we 
considered the logarithm of the number of past projects.  
In a similar way, we measured firms’ Cooperative Competence in the considered 
product area by the logarithm of the number of past collaborative projects (i.e. projects 
undertaken in collaboration with other prime contractors) at the time of the focal project launch.  
We also controlled for project year by using the project’s prototype first flight year 
(Prototype Year) to eliminate the trend effect, as the overall propensity to form alliances in 
aerospace appears to have increased over time, like in many other industries (Hagedoorn, 1993). 
Similar to other studies (Gulati, 1999), we used this quantitative measure rather than a dummy for 
each year (49 dummies) in order to economize on the number of predictors. Furthermore, prior 
research has found the same results whether quantitative or dummy variables are employed 
(Gulati, 1999). 
We also controlled for the four product types by creating four dummies (Helicopter, 
Fighter, Jet and Prop) because the resource requirements and/or the potential market size, and 
therefore the likelihood of cooperation vs. autonomous production might vary across them. For 
  19example, in the case of helicopters, the potential market is smaller and upfront investments (i.e. 
project scale) are greater than for other product types. Thus, we would expect firms undertaking a 
helicopter project to be more likely to form an alliance rather than to go for it on their own, when 
compared to developing other products. We coded Product Type with mean effect dummies
5.  
We controlled for industry concentration in each product domain at the time of project 
launch. This was done with a variable (Number of Competitors) that captures the number of 
incumbents actually producing and marketing aircraft of the considered type. While prior 
literature on alliance formation, which we claim primarily, focuses on complementary alliances, 
has suggested that more fragmented industries offer greater opportunities for collaboration, thus 
leading to a greater collaborative propensity, we argue that, because of the specific logic of scale 
alliances, greater industry concentration favors collaboration. Indeed, as mentioned previously, 
greater concentration enhances the price control benefits of alliances. In addition, based on our 
argument that scale alliances are formed by weaker competitors, we anticipate that industry 
concentration will increase the market power of leading incumbents and therefore the 
vulnerability of weaker competitors, which in turn will increase the latter’s need for collaboration 
or even collusion.  
We distinguished between projects developed for military purposes only (Military = 1) 
and those designed for a commercial or a dual use (Military = 0). Relative to projects with 
commercial applications, exclusively military projects might have a smaller potential market and 
therefore be more likely to be developed in collaboration. However, on the other hand, 
                                                 
5 As specified by Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell (2004: 708) “Mean effects dummies are appropriate when there is 
no conceptually motivated base case to compare the other cases to. The value of this approach is that the statistical 
test determines whether the effect of a variable differs significantly from the mean of the set of variables, rather than 
from a single omitted base case variable.” 
 
  20exclusively military projects might be less likely to be carried through cooperation than 
autonomously for political and national security reasons. 
Finally, we also included a variable recording whether the firm was State-owned. 
Although being state-owned might influence a firm’s governance mode choice, the direction of 
the effect is unclear. On the one hand, state-owned companies may enjoy government subsidies 
that help them overcome a lack of resources needed to internally develop aircraft. On the other 
hand, state-owned companies may be compelled to enter into collaborative ventures for political 
reasons. 
We now turn to the second stage of our analysis, concerning the influence of governance 
choice on sales and cost performance while controlling for the endogeneity of governance mode 
choice. 
Second stage dependent variables 
We first estimated Project Sales by the cumulative number of units sold over the entire 
life cycle of the project. For the 64 programs that had not reached the end of their production life 
by the end of the study period (2000), we extrapolated Project Sales based on the sales schedule 
of those programs that had ended by the end of the study period. Based on the 38 programs for 
which annual sales were available in the DMS Forecast database, we found that, on average, 
programs achieved 6% of their total production volume in the first year, 13% by the end of the 
second year, 68% by the end of the tenth year, 86% by the end of the fifteenth year. This enabled 
us to estimate the total production for the 64 programs that had not reached the end of their 
production life by 2000.  
  21Second, we assessed the cost performance of aircraft programs by recording their 
Development Time. This variable measures the time elapsed between the first flight of the 
aircraft prototype and the first delivery of production aircraft.  
Second stage control variables  
When modeling the influence of governance mode (scale alliance vs. autonomous 
production) on sales performance (model 2, dependent variable: Project Sales), we controlled for 
eight variables that may also influence the sales of a specific project: Firm Size, Domain-Specific 
Know-How, Market Size, Product Type, Military, Project Scale, Year and Number of 
Competitors. These variables were similar to the ones used in the first stage model but they were 
estimated one year before the deliveries of the focal aircraft began, instead of being measured one 
year before the prototype first flight. 
We controlled for Firm Size because we suspected larger firms to more easily reach 
greater sales on any given new project. We also included Domain-Specific Know-How because 
firms with more experience in a given line of business might be more able than others to achieve 
greater sales of aircraft in the same business domain. As new aircraft sales are likely to be 
impacted by the size of the market the focal firm has a privileged access to, we included the 
Market Size variable in the analysis. We also introduced Product Type (with four dummies: 
fighter, jet, prop and helicopter) to take into account demand differences between product types. 
We included a dummy variable recording whether the product was exclusively designed for a 
military use (Military) in order to capture possible differences between commercial and military 
markets and products. We also controlled for the level of upfront investment required to develop 
and produce the considered aircraft (Project scale) because, even within the same product type, 
products presenting very different features are likely to reach different levels of sales volumes. 
  22To capture any trend effects, we included a variable recording the year of the first deliveries 
(Year). We also included a variable estimating the structure of competition in the business area 
(Number of Competitors), because we expect a higher number of competitors in the product 
category to make it more difficult for any aircraft to reach larger sales.  
When modeling the influence of governance mode (scale alliance vs. autonomous 
production) on cost performance (model 3, dependent variable: development time), we 
controlled for six variables (Firm Size, Domain-Specific Know-How, Product Type, Military, 
Project Scale, Prototype Year) that may influence the development time of a given product. As in 
the first-stage model, these variables were estimated at the beginning of product development, i.e. 
one year before the prototype first flight. 
We first controlled for Firm Size and  Domain-Specific Know-How because we 
suspected that larger and more experienced companies, which benefit from either larger or more 
specialized resource endowments, are more likely to develop products in a shorter period of time 
than smaller and less experienced companies. To take into account differences in product life 
cycles and systematic differences in development times between different lines of business, we 
included the Product Type variable with its four above listed dummies (fighter, jet, prop and 
helicopter). We also included the Military variable because we suspected interactions between 
producing firms and bureaucratic customers to result in additional delays in development. We 
controlled for Project Scale, anticipating that more technologically complex products are longer 
to develop. Finally, to control for the evolution of technology over time, we included the Year 
variable (year prior to the prototype first flight).  
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The impact of scale alliances on project performance 
Our results support our theory: the two hypotheses we formulated are indeed verified. As 
far as Project Sales are concerned (model 2), firms launching cooperative projects reach greater 
sales levels than if they had launched similar projects autonomously (b = 0.635, p <0.05). 
Regarding cost performance, our results show that cooperation tends to increase Development 
Time (b = 1.976, p < 0.01, model 3). These results confirm the bi-directional impact of scale 
alliances on project performance: choosing to undertake a project through a scale alliance rather 
than autonomously tends to increase the project’s MES through higher development costs but 
increases the likelihood the project will achieve this MES thanks to greater sales.  
  Our findings also shed some light on the factors that lead firms to opt for a scale alliance 
rather than for autonomous production as well as on factors that influence project performance.. 
They also reveal that cooperation is not a random choice but rather a decision influenced by 
underlying firm and project characteristics (significant λ in models 2 and 3). This demonstrates 
that the endogeneity of governance mode choice must be taken into account in order to isolate the 
specific impact of cooperation on performance.  
Factors influencing scale alliance formation 
Model 1 is significant (chi-square = 77.98, p < .001) and confirms prior findings on scale 
alliance formation (Garrette, Castañer and Dussauge, 2006): firms undertaking projects 
characterized by higher upfront investments (Project Scale) are more likely to form scale 
alliances rather than produce autonomously (b = .451, p < .05). Regarding firm-level factors, we 
verified that larger firms (Firm Size) tend to prefer to use autonomous production than scale 
  24alliances (b = - .084, p < .05) and that firms undertaking projects in domains where they have 
greater  Cooperative Competence are more likely to opt for collaborative rather than 
autonomous production (b = 0.791, p < .05). The significant impact of the Year variable (b = 
0.047, p < .001) is consistent with prior alliance literature which has shown an increase in the rate 
of alliance formation over time (e.g. Hagedoorn, 1993). We also found that the propensity to 
collaborate varies significantly across Product Types. For example, helicopters are more 
commonly developed through a scale alliance than other aircraft types (b = 0.648, p < 0.1). 
Finally, we found that state-owned companies are more prone to use scale alliances than others 
(b = 0.629, p < 0.05). One plausible explanation for this is that, in aerospace, state-owned 
companies are driven into alliances for political reasons. 
Other factors influencing project performance  
Some of the control variables included in models 2 and 3 have a significant influence on 
product sales or on development time or on both.  
We found that firms benefiting from a larger experience in the business domain (Domain-
Specific Know-How) achieve greater sales performance on the products they launch. However, 
Domain-Specific Know-How has no significant influence on product Development Time. As 
expected, projects launched by firms with a privileged access to a larger market achieve greater 
sales, while products requiring higher levels of up-front investments (Product Scale) achieve 
smaller sales levels. Also, products designed for a military use achieve inferior sales and require a 
longer Development Time than civil or dual products. Finally, significant differences between 
product types can be noted: turboprop aircraft projects result in lower sales levels than other 
aircraft types, and all four product types differ significantly in terms of development time.  
 
  25DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our findings suggest that initial firm and project characteristics significantly influence the 
decision to cooperate or produce alone. All in all, cooperation is selected when the conditions for 
the economic success of the project are unfavorable, i.e. when the focal firm is in a weaker 
position and the project is riskier and more difficult to implement profitably. Those factors that 
drive firms to cooperate are thus likely to have a negative impact on project performance. In other 
words, firms choose to cooperate when they are faced with the need to offset adverse conditions. 
Our results on the impact of cooperation on project sales demonstrate that scale alliances make it 
more likely to achieve the project MES by enhancing sales relative to what the focal firm could 
achieve on its own. These results do not demonstrate, however, that, on average, collaborative 
projects achieve greater sales than single-firm projects. Indeed, running model 2 without 
accounting for endogeneity (i.e. assuming that cooperation is randomly selected across firms and 
projects) results in a non-significant impact of cooperation on project sales.  
Our results also show that even when those factors that induce cooperation are present, 
the impact of collaboration on performance is not unambiguously positive. Indeed, projects 
developed through scale alliances tend to incur higher upfront costs. Assuming the decision to 
cooperate is made rationally, one can infer that, for those firms and projects where cooperation is 
preferred over autonomous production, decision-makers expect the benefits of cooperation to 
outweigh its costs.  
This view of inter-firm cooperation is probably specific to scale alliances, i.e. alliances 
through which partners pool similar resources to collectively strengthen their position relative to 
stronger competitors. The logic of such scale alliances is very different from that of link alliances. 
In link alliances, partner firms combine their complementary strengths to exploit synergies and 
  26expand their business. Past research has shown that such link alliances are formed by competitors 
that possess strong resources in a particular area and seek to better leverage these strong 
resources by combining them with complementary assets held by partners. Our findings suggest 
that scale alliances in contrast are formed by weak firms that seek to pool their limited resources 
with partners that exhibit similar weaknesses. In this respect, link alliances appear to be primarily 
offensive in nature while our results strongly suggest that scale alliances are essentially defensive 
moves adopted by weaker or vulnerable competitors. In terms of performance, link alliances 
create value by making it possible for firms to exploit new opportunities beyond their current 
business scope, while scale alliances make it possible to compensate for competitive deficiencies.  
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  34Table 1: Statistical analysis 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
   COOP.  PROJECT SALES  DEVELOPMENT 
TIME 
FIRM SIZE (+)  -0.084*     0.078 
FIRM SIZE     -0.019    
COOPERATIVE COMPETENCE (+)  0.791**       
DOMAIN-SPECIFIC KNOW-HOW (+)  0.006     -0.154 
DOMAIN-SPECIFIC KNOW-HOW     0.227**    
MARKET SIZE (+)  -0.140       
MARKET SIZE     0.189***    
YEAR (+)  0.047***     0.022 
YEAR     -0.027***    
NUMBER OF COMPETITORS (+)  -0.019       
NUMBER OF COMPETITORS     -0.008    
STATE OWNED (+)  0.629**       
PROJECT SCALE  0.451**  -0.206**  0.143 
GDP GROWTH (+)  -5.933       
MILITARY -0.078  -0.338*  1.346*** 
FIGHTER (VS. GRAND MEAN)  -0.044  0.166  0.000 
HELICOPTER (VS. GRAND MEAN)  0.648*  -0.057  1.394** 
JET (VS. GRAND MEAN)  -0.503  0.149  -0.848** 
TURBOPROP (VS. GRAND MEAN)  -0.101  -0.257**  -0.546*** 
COOPERATION     0.635**  1.976*** 
MILLS RATIO     -0.375**  -0.796* 
CONSTANT -95.038*** 54.621***  -41.674 
Observations  225 (56)  225 (56)  225 (56) 
R-squared 0.290  0.140  0.308 
Robust p values in parentheses - standard errors adjusted for clustering on firm ID 
 + Estimated when development begun (one year before the prototype first flight) 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Two-tail tests       
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